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1 Introduction
The verificationist criterion of meaning was one of the logical empiricist’s primary
tools in their attempts to eliminate metaphysics. The criterion holds that a sentence
is cognitively meaningful, or truth-apt, only if it is either empirically confirmable,
analytic, or contradictory. Carnap, who was perhaps the most influential verification-
ist, believed that, while some traditional philosophical doctrines could be salvaged
through reconstruction in an “empiricist language” in which they would typically
be analytic, the criterion exposed as nonsense the most objectionable metaphysical
claims, such as Heidegger’s discussions of “the nothing” (Carnap, 1931, 229)
A classic objection argues that the statement of the verificationist criterion does
not itself meet the criterion; since verificationism is neither empirically confirmable,
analytic, nor contradictory, verificationism implies its own meaninglessness. The
criterion is thus as metaphysical as the sentences about “the Absolute” that it was
intended to eliminate.
This essay reconstructs Carnap’s response to this self-undermining objection to
verificationism. I begin in §1 by presenting work on this topic by Putnam and Rick-
etts. On Putnam’s interpretation, Carnap draws on his principle of tolerance to
construe verificationism as a non-cognitive proposal. Putnam argues that, since tol-
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erance presupposes verificationism, this response involves Carnap in a vicious circle.
Ricketts (1994) responds to Putnam on behalf of Carnap by denying that tolerance
presupposes verificationism; according to Ricketts, Carnap does not argue for toler-
ance, and his response to the self-undermining objection is therefore not circular.
I argue in §2.1 that both Putnam and Ricketts overlook Carnap’s basic move in
response to the self-undermining objection, i.e., his construal of verificationism as
an analytic sentence that is meaningful by its own lights. In §2.2, I consider what
kind of a definition verificationism provides and how to motivate it. I argue, against
Reichenbach, Ayer, and Hempel, that it is not an analysis of the everyday concept
of meaning. Instead, I claim, verificationism replaces the ordinary conception of
meaning with one that purports to capture all and only the expressions that are
pragmatically useful to the scientist. On my response to Putnam, then, in contrast to
Ricketts’, Carnap argues for verificationism on the basis of his pragmatism. In §3.1, I
consider whether pragmatism faces an analogue to the self-undermining objection to
verificationism. I argue that pragmatism is a preference concerning formal languages,
and that, since preferences need not apply to themselves, pragmatism is not self-
undermining.
2 Putnam and Ricketts on The Self-Undermining Objection
2.1 Putnam on the Self-Undermining Objection
In his “Philosophers and Human Understanding”, Hilary Putnam presses the self-
undermning objection to verificationism, then presents a response that he attributes
to Carnap. Carnap, on Putnam’s reading, grants, in response to the objection, that
verificationism is cognitively meaningless, but emphasizes that it is a practically
oriented proposal, viz. the proposal to restrict the choice of a language for science
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to languages every sentence of which meets the verificationist criterion; I will call
languages in the latter category empiricist languages.
Since verificationism is a proposal or recommendation, it is not self-applicable.
Verificationism is not a declarative sentence stating a general claim about cogni-
tively meaningful sentences that could be self-applied through universal instantiation.
Rather, it can be expressed as a suggestion like, ‘Let’s use an empiricist language’.
Carnap explicitly claims that these kinds of linguistic proposals can be both cogni-
tively meaningless and “important” (Carnap, 1956a, 214). In this way, Carnap grants
the cognitive meaninglessness of verificationism, but denies that it is a problem.
Putnam sees a vicious circularity in this defense of verificationism. As recon-
structed by Putnam, Carnap’s response to the self-undermining objection turns on
the thesis that advocacy of a language is non-cognitive. And Putnam takes this lat-
ter thesis to be Carnap’s principle of tolerance. Putnam’s thought is that the claim
that the verificationist decision to adopt an empiricist language is non-cognitive is a
special case of tolerance’s more general thesis that language choice is non-cognitive.
Putnam contends that tolerance in turn rests on, or is to be understood as, the
thesis that there are no facts that could render a language more correct than its
rivals; tolerance holds that language choice is non-cognitive because in choosing a
language for science, there are no facts that I risk leaving out or contradicting. Var-
ious significantly different languages are equally good, in so far as their postulates
cannot be said to contradict the facts. But, according to Putnam, Carnap’s only
reason for holding that there are no facts that could decide between rival languages
is his verificationism. We have thus come full circle from verificationism, through
tolerance, back to verificationism.
Putnam does not spell out the argument from verificationism to tolerance, nor
does he defend his assumption that this argument, whatever it is, is the only argu-
ment for tolerance; he simply writes: “the doctrine that no rational reconstruction
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is uniquely correct or corresponds to the way things ‘really are’, the doctrine that
all ‘external questions’ are without cognitive sense, is just the verification principle”
(1983, 191). Putnam’s thought, I take it, is that, for Carnap, the notion of fact that
could render one language more correct than another—the notion that is in play
when I ask, “There are numbers’ is a theorem of my language, but are there really
numbers?’— is an obscure pseudo-concept because it does not meet the verificationist
criterion.
2.2 Ricketts’ Response to Putnam
Ricketts (1994) responds to Putnam’s argument by denying that Carnap would have
grounded tolerance on verificationism. According to Ricketts, Putnam wrongly
supposes that Carnap, in adopting the principle of tolerance, assumes an
explanatory burden of excluding the general question of the representa-
tional adequacy of a language, and of discrediting the general notion of
fact, of the way the world is, that ineliminably figures in the formulation of
the question. It is the explanatory or justificatory character of the burden
that makes appeal to the principle of tolerance in defense of empiricism
viciously circular. (Ricketts, 1994, 178)
Putnam supposes that Carnap accepts the challenge of demonstrating the non-
existence of facts that could make some languages more correct than others. Having
accepted such a challenge, Carnap would have to provide an argument that would
demonstrate the non-existence of such facts, i.e., the truth of tolerance. The ar-
gument for tolerance that Putnam anticipates on behalf of Carnap draws on verifi-
cationism; thus, the attempt to justify tolerance puts Carnap on the circular path
described by Putnam.
Ricketts accepts Putnam’s characterization of tolerance as the rejection of any
notion of fact capable of grounding a notion of language correctness. Thus, Carnap
does not reject the “explanatory burden” of “discrediting the general notion of fact”
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because he accepts the notion, but rather because he rejects the explanatory burden.
According to Ricketts, Carnap would have to accept such a burden of proof only
if the general notion of fact met two conditions. First, the notion would have to
be “sufficiently clear” (Ricketts, 1994, p. 196). I take it that, if a notion is unclear
from some perspective, then an advocate of the perspective is not obliged to give
arguments against the unclear notion, beyond pointing out its unclarity.1
Second, an acceptable notion of fact would have to be able to “bear the weight of
Putnam’s challenge” (Ricketts, 1994, 196), i.e., to figure in a non-question-begging
argument against tolerance. A clarified notion of fact that grounds only circular ar-
guments against tolerance would not put any pressure on Carnap to justify tolerance.
As an example of an account of ‘fact’ that meets the first but not the second condi-
tion, Ricketts considers the following: it is a fact that p just in case the sentence q
is analytic or sufficiently empirically confirmed in my language, and q translates ‘p’.
We can use this notion of fact to define “correctness” with regard to the choice of a
language: “a language is correct just in case it includes a sublanguage that translates
my language” (Ricketts, 1994, 196). This account of fact, and of correctness, though
it would be suitably clear to Carnap, does not meet the second condition (bearing
the weight of Putnam’s challenge) because it
does not supply a reason for rejecting the principle of tolerance; rather it
reflects a refusal on my part to countenance any language that is not a
notional [sic] variant on my own, and so an outright rejection of Carnap’s
logical pluralism. (Ricketts, 1994, 196)
Ricketts anticipates an objection to his use of the clarity requirement on notions
of fact in his response to Putnam. Putnam (1983) argues that verificationism un-
dermines itself because it is a “criterial conceptions of rationality”, where the latter
1I believe that the notion of clarity invoked here is to be understood intuitively. Carnap sometimes talks about
concepts being unclear in virtue of being untranslatable into scientific language. However, as I discuss further below,
for Ricketts, untranslatability into an empiricist language is necessary but not sufficient for unclarity.
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is any conception according to which some preferred “institutionalized norms... de-
fine what is and is not rationally acceptable” (Putnam, 1983, 188). But as Ricketts
notes, the notion of clarity figuring in his first condition on notions of fact might be
thought to rely on a criterial conception of rationality, viz. verificationism: “Putnam
is objecting to Carnap’s conception of clarification, to the position that the clarifi-
cation of a thesis requires the statement of the thesis in an verificationist language”
(Ricketts, 1994, 196).
The core of Ricketts’ response is contained in the following passage:
Carnap’s requests for clarification do not draw on some theory, some con-
strictive view, of what clarification must amount to. He is open to consid-
ering whatever is offered by way of clarification. He, however, advocates
that when we find ourselves puzzled by some claim, we should formalize
the claim in a syntactically described language. It is not part of his view
that clarification is constituted by formalization (Ricketts, 1994, 196–97).
Ricketts takes translatability into an empiricist language to be sufficient but not
necessary for clarity; Ricketts denies that “the clarification of a thesis requires the
statement of the thesis in a verificationist language”.
It seems doubtful to me that Carnap doesn’t take translatability into an empiricist
language to constitute clarification. But what Ricketts might argue instead is that
Carnap can, in order to avoid begging the question, appeal to a shared conception
of clarification. I will set aside the question of whether his argument will work on
any such shared conception of clarification.
3 Verificationism
3.1 Verificationism: Internal and External
Both Putnam and Ricketts overlook the central move in Carnap’s response to the
self-undermining problem, viz., his construal of verificationism as an internal, ana-
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lytic statement. Carnap (1987, 48) explicitly responds this way. He discusses the
metaphysicians who press the self-undermining objection, and the anti-metaphysical
philosophers, like Wittgenstein, who bite the objection’s bullet. Carnap then re-
sponds,
[a]gainst all of them we shall here take the view that the sentences of the
logic of science [including statements of the verificationist criterion] are
sentences of the logical syntax of language. These sentences therefore lie in-
side the boundary drawn by Hume [i.e., the boundary between meaningful
and meaningless sentences]; for logical syntax is—as we shall see—nothing
but the mathematics of language. (48)
Verificationism, like other philosophical doctrines, can be meant in either an inter-
nal or an external sense, i.e., as a truth-apt statement of an empiricist language or as
the non-cognitive proposal of such a language. Verificationism, like other questions
about meaning,
involves reference to a certain language. Such a reference once made, we
must above all distinguish between two main kinds of questions about
meaningfulness; to the first kind belong the questions referring to a his-
torically given language-system, to the second kind those referring to a
language-system which is yet to be constructed. A question of the first
kind is a theoretical one; it asks, what is the actual state of affairs; and
the answer is either true or false. The second question is a practical one;
it asks, how shall we proceed; and the answer is not an assertion but a
proposal or decision. (Carnap, 1936, 3)
The internal, theoretical statement of verificationism refers to a historically given
language-system. In such language-systems, the question of the meaningfulness of
a sentence can be answered by the rules of the language, and is therefore analytic.
The external version of verificationism is the non-cognitive proposal to use a language
whose rules admit as meaningful only empirical or analytic sentences.
The verificationist thesis that all and only empirical or analytic sentences are
meaningful in an empiricist language L, on this approach, is not a substantive philo-
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sophical doctrine, but is rather a consequence of L’s vocabulary including only logical
or empirical terms. It is therefore wrong to assume, as Putnam does, that verifica-
tionism is external and practical, and that it can for this reason have no entailments.
Moreover, the internal version of verificationism does not fall afoul of its own stan-
dard of meaningfulness.
3.2 Verificationism and Definitions of Meaning
Construing the verificationist criterion as analytic invites the question: why treat an-
alyticity or empirical significance as necessary for meaningfulness? Reichenbach sees
the verificationist criterion as a definition of the everyday notion of meaningfulness.
Thus, Reichenbach held that the verificationist criterion is an adequate definition
of meaningfulness because it captures all differences in usage that are relevant to
behavior. But as Putnam points out, verificationism does not meet this standard:
Against [the] objection... that the non-empirical belief in a divinity... could
alter behavior) Reichenbach replied by proposing to translate ‘Cats are
divine animals’ as ‘Cats inspire feelings of awe in cat worshippers’. Clearly
the acceptance of this substitute would not leave behavior unchanged in
the case of the cat worshipper! (Putnam, 1983, 190-91 n. †)
Ayer maintains that the verificationist criterion is a “convention”, i.e.
a definition of meaning which accorded with common usage in the sense
that it set out the conditions that are in fact satisfied by statements which
are regarded as empirically informative. [The verificationists’] treatment
of a priori statements was also intended to provide an account of the way
in which such statements actually function. (Ayer, 1959, 15)
For Ayer, like Reichenbach, then, the adequacy of the verificationist criterion is
dependent on the empirical claim that it captures certain desired elements of the
ordinary concept. However, where Reichenbach proposes the criterion as an analysis
of the ordinary concept of meaning, Ayer, by contrast, takes common usage to rec-
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ognize several senses of meaning and to hold that the empiricist criterion captures
two such senses: that of empirical informativeness and that of a priority. Ayer’s
account is subject to two objections. First, Ayer’s account relies on analyticity to
capture the ordinary notion of meaning that pertains to a priori statements. But
this account succumbs to the same counterexamples as did Reichenbach’s. As most
logical empiricists recognized, many metaphysical statements will be untranslatable
into any empiricisit language. However, such statements are meaningful by ordinary
usage. Second, Ayer’s account simply pushes back the questions of motivation and
adequacy invited by the construal of the verificationist criterion as analytic. Ayer’s
account provides criteria for assessing the verificationist criterion, but the criteria
stand in equal need of justification. Ayer must offer some reason why we should
restrict our conception of meaning to a fragment of the ordinary conception.
Hempel (1950), like Reichenbach and Ayer, believes that the criterion aims to
capture the ordinary concept of meaning. However, he takes the criterion to be
an explication of the ordinary concept. As such, the criterion may “go beyond the
limitations, ambiguities, and inconsistencies of common usage” if doing so would
contribute to “a consistent and comprehensive theory of knowledge” (Hempel, 1950,
59). Thus, the verificationist criterion’s deviations from ordinary usage might be
outweighed by its contributions to the “comprehensiveness” of our theory of knowl-
edge. Thus, whereas the deviations between the verificationist criterion and ordinary
usage refute the criterion on Reichenbach’s construal, Hempel can respond that the
deviations are outweighed by the systematic advantages.
Hempel does not identify specific systematic benefits that might outweigh the
criterion’s mismatch with ordinary usage. I propose to approach this issue from the
perspective of what I call ‘Carnap’s pragmatism’. This doctrine has two components.
First,
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[T]he choice of a certain language structure... is a practical decision like
the choice of an instrument; it depends chiefly upon the purposes for which
the instrument—here the language—is intended to be used and upon the
properties of the instrument. (Carnap, 1956b, 43)
Second, the purpose of scientific language is the description and accurate prediction
of observable events. A language for science is more choice worthy the more efficiently
it performs this function.
Empiricist languages are to be preferred from this perspective because the ad-
dition of descriptive, non-empirical vocabulary—non-observational vocabulary that
makes no “difference for the prediction of an observable event” (Carnap, 1956c, 49)—
would not improve the language qua deductive instrument for science. As Goldfarb
and Ricketts put it, the addition of such vocabulary “doesn’t add to explanatory
scope” (Goldfarb and Ricketts, 1992, 75). It would, however, increase the language’s
complexity unnecessarily. The advantage of the criterion is the greater efficacy of
the languages that conform to it.
Since explication aims to both preserve and improve upon ordinary meaning, the
verificationist criterion’s possession of the advantage just discussed is not sufficient
to recommend the criterion as a successful explication. For as Putnam’s objection
to Reichenbach shows, the criterion deviates substantially from ordinary usage. And
I see no way of determining whether the advantage outweighs the deviation. The
criterion’s advocates and detractors are in a stalemate.
The verificationist would therefore strengthen her position by abandoning her
aim of capturing or explicating ordinary usage. She can then take the criterion to
introduce a novel concept, that of “ logical ” (Carnap, 1987, 48) meaning, that is un-
connected to the ordinary or psychological notions of meaning. Such an account
seems to me closer to Carnap’s understanding of the criterion. I know of no pas-
sage where Carnap describes the criterion as an explicatum, nor where he suggests
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that it captures ordinary usage. On the other hand, in the course of discussing
verificationism in “Testability and Meaning”, Carnap maintains that
[i]t would be advisable to avoid the terms ‘meaningful’ and ‘meaningless’
in this and in similar discussions—because these expressions involve so
many rather vague philosophical associations—and to replace them with
an expression of the form “a . . . sentence of L”; expressions of this form
will then refer to a specified language and will contain at the place ‘. . .’ an
adjective which indicates the methodological character of the sentence, e.g.
whether or not the sentence (and its negation) is verifiable or completely
or incompletely confirmable or completely or incompletely testable and the
like, according to what is intended by ‘meaningful’. (Carnap, 1936, 3)
In this passage, Carnap expresses no intention to capture the ordinary notion of
meaning with his criteria of empirical significance; indeed, he proposes to replace the
term ‘meaningful’ with methodological terms, without consideration for the extent
to which uses of the latter coincide with the former.
The self-undermining objection presupposes that the verificationist criterion, if
intended as an internal claim, would be meaningless by its own lights. If, as has been
argued in this section, the verificationist criterion may be an analytic definition, then
the self-undermining objection’s presupposition is false, and the objection does not
go through.
The response to the self-undermining objection that Putnam anticipates on be-
half of Carnap grants that verificationism is cognitively meaningless, but situates
this concession within Carnap’s tolerant conception of language, according to which
all linguistic decisions are non-cognitive. In this way, verificationism is said to pre-
suppose tolerance; this is the first step in the circle. Putnam then argues that,
tolerance, in turn, presupposes verificationism; this second step completes the cir-
cle. The response to the self-undermining objection developed in this section avoids
the first step of the circuliarity; on my account, verificationism does not presuppose
tolerance. It is true that, for Carnap, linguistic choices, including the decision to
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restrict oneself to empiricist languages, is non-cognitive. Moreover, Carnap regards
the pragmatist considerations with which I motivated the criterion as practical and
non-cognitive. Nonetheless, my response does not presuppose tolerance. One could,
consistently with the rest of the argument of this section, regard the systematic ad-
vantages motivating the verificationist criterion as theoretical; one could hold that
the simplicity that distinguishes empiricist languages is a cognitive advantage. Tol-
erance shapes Carnap’s understanding of verificationism, but he does not give any
argument for verificationism in which tolerance is a premise.
Ricketts denies the second step of Putnam’s circle. According to Ricketts, Car-
nap does not argue from verificationism to tolerance and, indeed, does not argue
for tolerance at all—Carnap rejects such an “explanatory or justificatory... bur-
den” (Ricketts, 1994, 178). Ricketts maintains that, since the notion of fact that
tolerance rejects is neither sufficiently clear nor part of a non-circular objection to
tolerance, Carnap does not owe us a non-question-begging objection against the no-
tion. I agree with Ricketts that Carnap does not owe us an argument for tolerance;
Carnap’s view would be at least coherent even if lacked the means to give such an
argument. However, it would be preferable to have a non-question-begging argument
for tolerance—so long as the argument does not incur Putnam’s circle. My response
is agnostic concerning whether Carnap has such an argument.2
2My own view is that Carnap’s tolerance derives from his pragmatism. But the issue is beyond the scope of this
essay.
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4 The Self-Undermining Objection and the Status of Prag-
matism
4.1 Is Pragmatism Self-Undermining?
In §1.2, I discussed Putnam’s contention that all criterial conceptions of rational-
ity are self-undermining, or at least, cannot be non-circularly demonstrated. I have
given the argument from pragmatism to verificationism that, I claim, underlies Car-
nap’s verificationism. If the argument succeeds, then Carnap has a non-circular
argument for verificationism. However, the argument does not fully address Put-
nam’s objection, but merely shifts the target of the objection from verificationism to
pragmatism. On my reconstruction of Carnap’s view, Putnam might say, verifica-
tionism is no longer a criterial conception of rationality, but pragmatism is, because
it sets out the norms that purport to be, or to contain, rationality. But, according
to Putnam, all criterial conceptions of rationality are vulnerable to their own version
of the self-undermining objection that has been directed at verificationism.
The self-undermining objection to Carnap’s pragmatism that I have in mind runs
as follows. According to pragmatism, it is either useful for predictive purposes to
include a thesis as a meaningful sentence of our language, or else we should not do so.
But pragmatism is not useful for the description or prediction of observation reports,
nor is any set of postulates that entail it. So we should not include pragmatism as
a sentence of our language. Pragmatism is therefore self-undermining: it cannot be
formulated within any language that is admissible by its own lights.
The objection wrongly assumes that pragmatism must be expressible within one
of the languages towards which it is directed. But pragmatism is a set of preferences,
of what Ricketts calls “values and desiderata” (Ricketts, 2009, 225), that some bring
to the choice of language. There is no reason to think that the legitimacy of such a
13
preference depends on its formalizability in one of the languages that it recommends.
Analogously, a preference for vanilla ice cream is not illegitimate because it (the
preference) is not itself a scoops of vanilla ice cream.
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